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WHITE PAPER
In Overview of Prospective Organizational Structures
in the Solar Power Satellite Field"
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this White Paper is to identify and compare potential
organizational options for a solar power satellite system (SPS).
This effort included a literature survey, interviews with acknowledged
experts in the fields of organizational entities, space, solar energy, and the SPS
concept, and an analysis of these inputs in order to identify the organizational
alternatives and make judgments as to their feasibility to serve as patterns for
a future SPS entity.
Selection and evaluation criteria were determined to include timeli-
ness, reliability, and adequacy to contribute meaningfully to the U. S. supply;
political feasibility (both national and international); and cost-effectiveness
(including environmental and other external costs) . Based on these criteria,
four organizational alternatives appeared to offer reasonable promise as potential
options for SPS. These included three domestic alternatives and one international
alternative.
A large number of key issues emerged from the analysis as being
factors which would influence the final selection process. Among these issues
were a variety having to do with international law, international institutions,
environmental controls, economics, operational flexibility, congressional
policies, commercial-vs-governmental ownership, national dedication, and
national and operational strategic issues.
Recommendations were made for further study on potential
international institutional barriers, strategic safeguards, international
acceptance of SPS, and factors likely to affect U.S.  participation in various
types of SPS, organizations.
INTRODUCTION
In approaching the subject of feasible SPS organizational structures,
it was found useful, first, to conduct a survey of any similar organizations which
had been formed in recent years and which could serve as a parallel to any
future SPS organization. Further, a second surv.-y ► was then made which
solicited expert opinions from those national figures who might give important
insight into the potential suitability and effectiveness of possible structural
alternatives for SPS, particularly in relation to U. S. political advantage,
economic success, multinational participation, timely deployment, and potential
barriers. Finally, this White Paper was developed to set forth the results of
these surveys, with an analysis of the political, environmental, economic,
and safety aspects, as well as others, of each reasonably implementable
potential structure.
From the very beginning of this effort, it was obvious that the
comparatively recently formed entities, Comsat and INTELSAT, would be
those with which the surveyed experts would logically compare a potential SPS
system organization. Yet all agreed that the parallel was not at all exact,
and, indeed, that the magnitude of the differences was sufficient to raise some
doubt as to whether or not the final path of SPS would follow the Comsat/
INTELSAT pattern of organizational development.
In order to make a critical comparison between alternative SPS
organizational structuret terms of political, international, environmental,
and economic factors, it s necessary first to identify the major organiza-
tional options, and to select and formulate broad criteria by which such
comparisons could be made. In this brief report, the comparisons are
necessarily preliminary, leaving more detailed analysis to longer-term future
studies. Present or recent organizations which parallel many of the future
needs of SPS are identified as follows:
1. International agencies, such as CERN, INTELSAT, or ESA;
2 . U. S . Government agencies or instrumentalities, such as the TVA or
AEC; and
3. Domestic corporations, such as:
a. Public (e.g., the U.S. Postal Service),
b. Non-Profit (e.g., Blue Cross/Blue Shield),
c. Business (e.g., ConEd), or
d. Public-private (e.g., Comsat, Amtrak) .
It is pointed out that the choice among these options need not be considered a
permanent one. For example, a domestic organization could be formed which
might later beebme international, or might associate itself with an inter-
national affiliate, perhaps to perform research or technological development
or assessment. The present state of SPS technology and the large expenditures
anticipated for SPS research and development indicate the desirability of
multinational participation and cost-sharing. On the other hand, it is recognized
that the transition of a national organization to international status may not be
readily accepted by other countries, as the Comsat experience shows; and, in
addition, the launching of a subsequent international organization tends to be
slow and difficult, with a resulting loss of U.S.  control (cf. . the World
Authority for the Seabed and INTELSAT) .
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	 The majority of the experts who were interviewed in the course
of this study indicated their expectation that the SPS would probably (but by no
means certainly) repeat the course of historical development followed by Comsat •-
that is, that it would be organized as a U.S. business corporation, subject to
Federal regulation and other controls, to be supplemented later by an inter-
national organization. (These people were regarded as experts because of their
familiarity with space and energy technology, the SPS concept, and large
organizational structures as well) . On the other hand, a number of younger
students of government subsequently interviewed for purposes of comparison
seemed to favor setting up an international SPS erganization, and to prefer U . S .
Government agency participation, rather than a U.S.  business corporation,
to represent the United States within that framework. With all due respect to
the latter group, they did not appear to be completely informed as to the rather
complex organizational makeup of the Comsat and INTELSAT entities. They
seemed, rather, to be reflecting the current spirit of the times, and this, of
course, must also be of legitimate concern to any future SPS organizational
planners.
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
1. Comparison Criteria
In undertaking to make independent preliminary comparisons among SPS
organizational options, the preparers of this paper considered a substantial
number (15 to 20) of candidate criteria. These were not mutually exclusive
nor of equal importance. Some criteria were suggested by interviews, some
by reading, and some by consideration of the problems likely to be faced by
any major SPS effort. On analysis, some were seen to be corollaries or
subsets of one or more others by a slightly broader formulation.
In the end, four tentative basic criteria were proposed for comparing and
judging SPS organizational options. Although they interact substantially,
these are believed to be distinct criteria, which can include, as corollaries
or subsets, all the other candidate criteria which have been suggested.
Their significance and relationships will now be briefly discussed.
The first criterion might be termed the adequate, timely, and
reliable contribution to U.S.  energy supply. This is regarded as the primary
goal of an SPS program from the U.S.  standpoint .
The present state of SPS technology, the cost and timing of the
necessary R&D, and the technical (and the first-order economic) feasibility
of the SPS may be included under this heading. Another factor is some present
uncertainty regarding the SPS technology, which has not yet been totally
demonstrated to be feasible technically, let alone economically -- unlike
our comparative confidence in communication satellite technology in the early
1960's, when Comsat was formed. Technological uncertainty affects our
national judgment as to whether or not to pursue even a limited scale
prototype of an SPS system because we presently lack full confidence
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that it can provide a reliable and commercial energy source. In addition, the
distribution of any economic gain resulting from a deployed SPS system is a
significant factor, especially for an international system, since it is not very
likely that an internationally sponsored SPS hardware system would have a large
portion of its electrical output beamed down to the United States, rather than to
the other participating countries. Hence its adequacy to serve U.. S. power
needs may not be immediately realized.
Still another aspect of the contribution to U. S . energy supply is
physical and strategic security. Because this subject has political implications,
it will be discussed in the following Section.
The second criterion is domestic U.S. political feasibility.
This factor is plainly critical to U.S.  participation in any SPS organization,
regardless of its form. Congressional authorization and fwiding, as well as
Presidential and public support, are essential. In an interview conducted for
this study, the opinion was volunteered that Congress would not authorize or
"pour money into' an international organization which was not subject to
substantial U. S. control. If this is an accurate political judgment, as it may
well be, it points to a feasibility factor which may discriminate among
different kinds of international SPS organizations, as well as between a
domestic SPS organization and an international one.
-Congress is likely to be influenced, in considering U. S.
participation in an SPS program, by many factors including environmental
compatibility, cost-effectiveness, the physical security and reliability of
energy supply to the United States, pricing controls and service, U.S.  energy
export potential, the distribution of economic gain, and equitable and non-
discriminatory access to the SPS system. Several of these matters are
discussed elsewhere in this report. The problem of physical and strategic
security calls for further comment here.
There are various technological means of interrupting or otherwise
adversely affecting an SPS energy beam. For example, one or more satellites
could be attacked with weapons and disabled, or an unauthorized command
signal could shut off the transmitter. Appropriate safeguards must be provided
from the early planning stages so that those who are expected to authorize the
establishment of an SPS organization will have the confidence in its dependability
necessary to proceed with its inauguration.
Many opinions will be offered, and national policies suggested, as
to the reliability of relying upon SPS power. Some experts consider that if the
United States maintains physical control over the SPS system that it may be
considered a dependable source of energy to our nation. Others recommend
that U.S. energy reliance on the SPS be limited, looking to other sources for
our most essential energy supplies. Similar thoughts occuring to the energy
experts of other countries may reduce the acceptability to them of energy from
any SPS system under U. S . or other outside control.
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However, this dilemma may be less serious than it seems at
first sight. There will certainly be more than one satellite -- perhaps one
or more for each country that consumes large amounts of energy, and one or
more for each group of smaller countries that are willing to combine as
neighbors for the common good. Secondly, the technological problem of
safeguarding a nation's supply of energy in times of conflict is not unique to
the SPS system. Indeed, an attack against a nation's SPS orbital hardware
could be considered as much a provocation for war as if that attack had taken
place against a hydroelectric dam located within that nation's boundaries.
From a broader standpoint, it may be observed that communication satellite
services are similarly interruptible by foreign action, and may well be
interrupted as a prelude or concomitant to war, and that U. S . oil supplies
from abroad may be and have been reduced by foreign action for foreign
motives.
Sabotage, either by foreign agents or by radical elements of our
society, may constitute another threat to an SPS system, but initial tradeoff
studies indicate that the SPS system would probably be no more vulnerable
to sabotage d= are the present large nuclear-electric generation plants.
The vulnerability question deserves a great deal of additional study before
valid conclusions may be reached, for the SPS system is unique as a major
utility prospect.
Certainly the strategic and political issues also deserve further
study. At present, their implications for SPS organizational options are not
entirely clear. The overall uncertainty seems to pose a serious barrier or
`	 constraint not only to the formation of an international SPS system, whether
or not subject to substantial U. S. control, but also to the export of energy
from a U.S. system except to close allies of the United States.
A third criterion is cost-effectiveness. This is the comprehen-
sive economic criterion generally used in decision-making. The economically
rational choice among a set of options which meet other criteria is the most
cost-effective. This does not always mean lowest cost per unit of energy,
for other factors contribute to the price acceptability of an energy commodity
(roll-in prices are often used to accommodate the exceptions). Certainly the
system flexibility and reduced pollution aspects of the SPS are considerations
important enough to justify some price differentials, to say nothing of the
potential balance of trade benefits.
In conventional cost-benefit analysis, costs and benefits are
sometimes defined rather narrowly. The principal SPS benefits can be taken
into account without difficulty: contribution to the U. S . energy supply,
U. S . energy export potential, and even physical security and reliability (as
a risk) . On the cost side, however, it is essential to include the major
external costs, particularly social and environmental impacts. Unless this
is done, cost-effectiveness is too narrow a criterion. When external costs
are omitted, the usual method is to treat them as constraints; for example,
costs and benefits are measured within the limits of minimum acceptable
envi ronmenta 1 damage.
A major factor in the cost-effectiveness of an SPS system is
the present state of applicable technology and the cost and timing of the
necessary research and development. Minor factors include the distribution
of economic gains and equitable and non-discriminatory access to the systenn.
It appears unlikely at this point that the projected huge SPS
development costs would ever be charged on a pro rata basis to future SPS
energy users (through, perhaps, surcharges to the user utility companies);
there is too much historical precedent to the contrary (aircraft, Comsat,
nuclear energy) . Yet, from our national standpoint, we could do well to
urge some of the other energy-hungry nations of the world to join with us in
sponsoring the R&D phases of the SPS, thus relieving the United States of
the bulk of the economic burden it now faces in pursuing the SPS. Whether
such fiscal participation could be arranged, or whether such arrangements
might lead to sufficient international bickering to delay or even kill the
project, is indeterminable at this point, as is the question of the reaction
of Congress to such arrangements. Both Congress and the Office of
Management and Budget might be swayed, however, into preferring the
formation of an international organization if several foreign nations were to
volunteer to contribute sizable sums towards SPS R&D funding on the
understanding that they could then become major owners of a future SPS
hardware system deployment.
The final criterion is international acceptability and cooperation.
This criterion significantly affects all the others, and may be crucial even for
an exclusively U.S.  system because of the probable need for international
agreement on frequency and geosynchronous orbital slot allocations. This
factor operates as a constraint on the type of SPS organization that best
satisfies the other criteria. On the other hand, the political and psychological
consequences of a broad and strong international support would constitute
independent benefits of an SPS system, and would also increase other benefits
(such as U.S. energy export potential) and hence increase its cost-effectiveness
International acceptability will depend largely on the exact form
of the SPS organization, including the nature and extent of multinational
participation. The subject is. of course, too large to have been addressed
in detail under this first-cut effort, and it requires a great deal of further
study; nonetheless, the major issues will now be briefly identified and discussed.
Other countries, especially Communist arid Third World countries,
are likely to contend that solar energy is a common resource of mankind, not
subject to national sovereignty or appropriation. In the past, they have taken
this attitude toward outer space (including geosynchronous orbits), seabed
resources, and the radio-frequency spectrum. This is a respectable point of
view, and deserves to be met seriously, not merely dismissed as self-
serving. Nevertheless, it may be pointed out, solar energy differs from
mineral and other finite resources in being a flow and not a stock, and for
all practical purposes an unlimited resource. In the language of past
international resolutions and agreements, it is a sharable and not an
exclusive resource.
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On the other hand, geosynchronous orbits sad the electro-
magnetic spectrum are, of course, limited. Their limits and problems
of equitable and efficient multinational use and access involve many complex
technical and institutional factors, and introduce questions which are not
likely to be resolved easily or quickly. For example, to what extent would
microwave energy transmissions from an SPS interfere with communications
satellite or other microwave telecommunications transmissions? What
distance or angular separation would be necessary to avoid undue interference?
How many geosynchronous slots would be required for SPS use, and in what
preferred (optimum) locations? These and many similar questions must be
answered with reasonable certainty before international negotiations on the
subject can be conducted profitably, and there is every likelihood that
international agreements on frequency and geosynchronous orbital slot
allocations will have to be consummated prior to any large scale deployment
of SPS systems hardware.
G
	
	
Other kinds of questions will significantly affect international
acceptability as well as the other factors listed in this report. Social and
environmental impacts, for example, must be carefully assessed. A
practical balance between U.S. control and multinational participation
must be struck, preferably in such a way as to maximize cost-effectiveness
and the major benefits to be derived from an SPS system. If all of these
factors are not considered carefully, with policies adopted to reasonably
satisfy the other nations of the world, international resistance may result
which would impede, or even completely prevent. the ultimate deployment
of SPS orbital hardware, and even the formation of an international SPS entity
may prove impossible.
In this connection, it may be noted that under the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty. no portion of outer space may be made subject to a claim
of national sovereignty. Geosynchronous orbits are parts of outer space
within the meaning of this provision. However. the United States need not
assert its sovereignty over geosynchronous orbits in order to use them,
since outer space is res communis and thus available for use by all nations,
like the high seas. The question nevertheless remains whether the United
States is bound by its adherence to the International Telecommunications Union
and related agreements to observe ITU allocations of frequencies and geo-
synchronous orbits for purposes other than international telecommunications
This issue of international law deserves further study.
Z. Application of Criteria
In the following table (TABLE I), the tentative criteria were
applied to the various types of SPS organizations. A rating of High, Medium.
or Low, was given to each organizational option with respect to each criterion.
The ratings were recognized as subjective Judgments, and the criteria were not
weighted. The table is therefore merely illustrative of what might be done by
way of comparison, and it is believed that an assessment process of this kind
would be useful if carried to a higher stage of refinement and if the criteria,
weights, and ratings reflected the objective assessements of a large number
of qualified experts.
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TABLE II compares the characteristics of the leading candidate
options for the prospective SPS organization. It indicates that there are no uni-
que organizational features suggested here, although some could be included
if they projected beneficial results. None are really required for the program.
Each option has its own particular startup problems, but none of these is an
absolute barrier to achieving an SPS organization. Most organizations have
problems during their formative period, the small as well as the large,
and SPS will not be an exception.
It is difficult to project organization formation time, but once
the parties have an agreement in principle, the formation time should not be
an unreasonable one. The international option, of course, may be expected
to take somewhat longer to develop than the domestic alternatives.
KEY ISSUES AND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
There are a large number of key questions which will face the
future organizers of an operational SPS system, and will strongly affect its
structure and operations. Chief among these are the following:
1. International law and international politics
Is the United States bound legally or constrained politically to comply
with the preferences of the International Telecommunications Union as to
geosynchronous orbit slot location for future SPS hardware deployment?
Will the International Court of Justice recognize any future claims made
by equatorial states that the sun is being blocked from their lands by an
SPS (however insignificant the amount of sun blockage might be)? Might
they recognize claims that an SPS' which was beaming energy to a receiving
antenna located off the coast of Florida was debilitating migratory birds
which normally nested (or were killed for food) within their own boundaries
during another portion of the year? Might legal claims be made, :.nd even
injunctions granted, in international courts to prevent an SPS-deploying
nation from "destroying our ozone layer"? Will some perceived risk of
space fallout from a large number of deployed SPS structures dampen
international enthusiasm for such projects? If the future SPS organizational
structure were to be an international entity (i.e., internationally financed
and controlled), what is the likelihood that the power output of the first
full-scale system would be committed to the United States? What are the
principal factors affecting international acceptance of various types of SPS
organizations?
2. Operational and strategic issues
Would any single country, like the United States, be trusted by all of
the other world powers to exert exclusive control over an operational
satellite which might have a power output available in orbit of as much as
ten gigawatts? What safeguards and arrangements (if any) would be
necessary and sufficient to safeguard the physical security of the SPS
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contribution to the U.S.  (or any other) national energy supply? Would
the "on-off" control of the power output be placed exclusively in the hands
of the receiving country? If so, and the system were internationally
owned, how would the operators turn off the power in the event that the
receiving country refused to pay its power bill? If not, how would the
receiver nation be assured of a steadv supply of uninterrupted energy?
Would the United Nations be a willing custodian of the SPS control switch?
How sacrosanct would an SPS orbital installation be considered? That is,
would an attack on a U.S.  -owned SPS ortwital installation be considered
an "act of war"?
3. Economic issues
What are the practical economics of the SPS, and how soon can they be
convincingly established to the extent that potential investors (national,
international, commercial) would have the confidence necessary to commit
themselves to a full-scale prototype system? Even if the cost per kilowatt
hour of delivered SPS power appears to be appreciably more than that
associated with imported oil, would our nation's balance-of-payments
benefits derived from an SPS provide such an overriding argument that it
would nevertheless be politically adopted, using roll-in prices? Would the
system flexibility and reduced pollution aspects of SPS provide similar
overriding reasons to adopt the power satellite system? If an international
antity were to be selected as a desirable vehicle for SPS, could the other
interested countries be induced to contribute funds to the R&D phase of the
`•	 SPS effort to thus relieve the financial burden of the United States during
the critical development cycle of the program?
4. U.S.  domestic political issues
What are the principal factors affecting the political feasibility of U.S.
participation in various SPS organizational alternatives? Could a large
enough number of SPS orbital installations be deployed within a near enough
time frame to warrant considering SPS a viable alternative to, say, coal
or nuclear power to satisfy today's political needs for establishing it as a
realistic solution to our energy crisis, in terms of dedicating national
funding, materials, and manpower resources to its accomplishment? Will
environmentalists consider SPS in the role of a system which will help save
the environment because of the air and water pollution it replaces under an
alternative coal system, or will they, instead, concentrate on concerns over
added microwave pollution? At whatever future date an SPS organizational
entity will be proposed by the Congress or by the President, will ournational
Zeitgeist cause the legislation to reflect a domestic or international
preference, and a commercially- •ci^ntrolled or governmental agency-controlled
preference?
It is recognized that the SPS organizational entity may not follow directly
in the footsteps of the Comsat/INTELSAT precedence, not only because of
strategic differences SPS presents, but because the economic feasibility is
not yet established and a single customer-country could likely take all of
I
1,
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the power from a given SPS transmitter. Also, the first entity established
may not be a permanent one, or it may later be modified (as was Comsat),
or it might be combined with other entities.
As was noted previously, the criteria for the selection of a future
SPS organization were established as: adequacy, timeliness, and
reliability to serve U. S . national energy needs; U. S . domestic political
compatibility; cost-effectiveness; and international acceptability and
cooperation. These appeared to embrace all of the likely determining
factors for the SPS case.
Besides the timing question of the development cycle and implemental
phase of SPS, the most difficult question to address is whether the initial
entity should be a domestic or an international organization. Some of the
pros and cons of an international organization are as follows:
1. Pros
International approval of our SPS efforts might be easier to obtain.
More countries might be likely to buy the product as they would
feel more like they were participants.
Frequency and geosynchronous slot allocations might be easier
to obtain from ITU .
The risk of interruption by foreign or terrorist action might be
reduced.
2. Cons
The U. S . would likely lose control of the organization at the very
beginning of the effort.
There would probably be delays in the initiation, development, and
deployment of the operational SPS.
There would more likely be attendant system and operational
inefficiencies (affecting costs and services) .
Runs the risk of reduced level of contribution to the U.S. energy supply.
Would probably make Congressional approval more difficult to obtain
unless assurances v,^re given that U.S. would maintain full operational
control.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
Further study of the following topics during fiscal year 1979 is recommended
in order to answer the key questions previously identified in this White Paper:
1. To what extent would the United States be bound or constrained, in
developing and deploying an operational SPS system, by ITU allocations of
electromagnetic frequencies and geosynchronous orbital slots?
2. The identification of measures and arrangements necessary and
sufficient to safeguard the physical security of energy received from SPS
by the United States and other countries.
3. The identification and analysis of the principal factors likely to
affect international acceptance of various types of SPS organizations.
4. The identification and analysis of the principal factors likely to
affect U.S. participation in various types of SPS organizations.
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